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Abstract: In the present essay we analyse for the first time as far as we know the 
development of democracy, which emerged in Greece during the classical period, into 
the proto-federations of the democratic city-states. We examine their political 
institutions and policies, like common defense and external policy, military 
organization, representative federal bodies like popular assemblies, parliament, 
generals as military and political commanders, federal finance ministers etc., as well 
as their economic institutions and policies: Common currency, federal budget and 
federal revenues. We address in more detail as a case study the Achaean Federation. 
Then, we compare this particular proto-federation with the United Provinces (UP, the 
Dutch Republic) and show structural and organizational similarities. Lastly, we 
compare the Achaean federation with today’s European Union (EU) and conclude that 
in some respects the proto-federation was more advanced than the EU, and thus can 
serve as a benchmark in addressing current European issues.  
 
1. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that direct democracy emerged by the end of the 6
th
 
century BC in classical Greece, the first fully developed example being Athens after 
Cleisthenes reforms of 510-507 and the fall of tyranny. This development was the 
result of a preceding macroculture, a long term framework of values, norms, customs, 
institutions and ideas that evolved in different fields of human activity, like war, 
religion, athletics, and the city-state, which in their combination were unique in 8
th
 to 
6
th
 century Greece.(Kyriazis and Economou, 2012 a,b).    
 The emergence of democracy was preceded by a previous political stage, that 
of isonomia, equality of citizens (in most cases according to property criteria, and 
linked to that, to those able to afford the expensive hoplite equipment, financed 
through their own means) before the law. (Birgalias, 2009; Meier, 2011). Democracy 
was not static but evolutionary. 4
th
 century BC democracy was for example more 
developed institutionally and also more “balanced” than its 5th century predecessor 
(Hansen, 1999; Kyriazis, 2009; Halkos and Kyriazis, 2010).   
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 What is less known generally, but very important due to the early modern and 
contemporary developments is that within the same democratic macroculture the idea 
of voluntary federations of democratic city-states emerged also, and was practiced.  
Leagues and alliances were of course well known during the sixth and fifth centuries, 
and even much earlier, since the Mycenaean Kingdoms who fought the Trojan war 
(during the late 13
th
 or early 12
th
 century BC) were an ad-hoc alliance under a 
“supreme military commander” king Agamemnon of Mycenae.    
 But the concept of federations of free democratic city-states that unite 
voluntarily to evolve into a specific political unit with an appropriate institutional 
structure was completely novel in its width and depth.
1
 Federations, like the Boeotian 
one, and many more, are attested already with certainty during the 7
th
 century, but 
what was new with the great 4
th
 century federations was their democratic basis, both 
at participating city-state and federal level, as well as their elaborate political and 
economic structure.
2
         
 In the present essay we analyse first, as a case study, the Achaean federation. 
Then, we compare it to the 16
th
-17
th
 century United Provinces federation, the second 
modern (after the Swiss) federation to emerge, and trace their institutional similarities. 
Then, we compare the Achaean federation to present data ones, with emphasis on the 
European Union and make some suggestions as to what lessons for today’s 
development of the EU can be drown form the functioning of the Greek proto-
federations 
2. The Achaean federation 
The Achaean federation was established in 280 BC, but an older alliance of 
city-states of the North-Western Peloponnese comprising 12 members is attested 
already during the 5
th
 century and may have served as a model for the Achaean 
federation (Rathjen, 1965). The main reason for its establishment, as was the case also 
for the other major contemporary federation, was defense against the Macedonian 
kingdom.           
 The federation increased from 10 members in 280, to as many as 50 members 
later. It developed from a regional federation, by the voluntary adhesion of city-states 
all over the Northern and Central Peloponnese including such important ones like 
Sikyon (251 BC), Corinth (243 BC), Megalopolis (capital of the ex-Arcadian 
federation, 235 BC) and Argos (229 BC). (Polybius, Histories 2. 41; Caspari, 1914, 
Griffith, 1935, Russel and Cohn, 2012). The federation was a major political force in 
Greece, trying to balance Macedonian and Spartan power in a series of wars and 
shifting alliances, being successful in safeguarding its city-states independence 
against both powers. It was abolished after resisting Roman encroachment, being 
                                                          
1
 Many modern authors continue to call them “leagues”. As will become clear in the text, this 
denomination is inappropriate, since the term “league” is almost a synonym of “alliance”. The political 
units we will examine are certainly much more than a mere alliance, thus we will define them as proto-
federations. 
2
 Caspari (1917) analyses the system of monetary circulation of 18 Greek proto-federations of the so 
called Hellenistic era (4
th
 to 2
nd
 century BC). 
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decisively beaten by the Romans at the battle of Leukopetra in 146 BC, and the 
destruction of Corinth.        
 This is not only spelled the end of the federation, but the end of Greek 
independence and the abolishment of democratic regimes. Achaea formed during the 
first century BC a roman province (Badian, 1952; Oliver, 1978).  
 
2.1 Political organisation  
The main contemporary source concerning the federation is Polybius, but the 
information he provides has led modern historians sometimes to different 
interpretations. The main institutional bodies of the Achaean federation were the 
Assembly, to which all citizens of all constituting city-states aged 30 and above could 
participate (Pol. Hist. 29. 23-35; 29. 24.6; Larsen, 1972). Apparently, the Assembly 
was called for specific purposes within the years, to decide on specific important 
issues.           
 Possibly, the Assembly was called once a year during April-May, which may 
be an indication that strategic matters for the year were discussed and decided upon, 
since spring (April) was usually the beginning of the campaigning season during 
ancient times. A second political body was the Synodos or Boule, which may have 
been a preparatory body which set-up the agenda for the Assembly's meeting, having 
perhaps as a model the Athenian Boule (Pol. Hist. 2. 46. 6).    
 It appears though, that for the period 217-200 BC, the Assembly decided on 
issues of great importance like war and alliances, and delegated day to day affairs of 
the federation to the Boule. The members of the boule were elected representatives of 
the city-states (Larsen, 1972, p. 178-180). If this interpretation is correct, then we 
have, for the first time in history, a mixed democratic system combining elements of 
direct democracy, the Assembly, with elements of representative democracy, the 
Boule.            
 The reason for the development of this dual system must have been that as the 
federation increased in size, distances became longer, thus making the participation of 
simple citizens costly and time consuming. The distance for example from the city of 
Patra to the capital of  the federation, Aigion, is about 100 km, and from Megalopolis 
to Aigion more or less the same, necessitating if one takes account of the roads of the 
period, at least three days and likely four or five on foot to travel to Aigion (Caspari, 
1914; Briscoe, 1974).         
 It seems also, that the federation did not provide its citizens with a 
remuneration for participating in the Assembly as was the case in classical Athens. It 
is not known if this was a conscious political decision, or was due to an economic 
impossibility to provide funds for this participation, but the result was that in the 
Assembly more prosperous citizens tended to be overrepresented (Briscoe, 1974). On 
the other hand, since members of the Boule were voted locally in their city-states, 
they were more representative of all citizens.     
 At the beginning, the Assembly met at the federation's capital, Aigion, but 
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later on, General Philopoemen established a system under which the Assembly met 
periodically also in other member city-states like Argos. The other institutional bodies 
of the federation were elected by the Assembly. First, among them was the Strategos, 
(the General), who was combining the offices of supreme military commander of the 
military forces, and of political head of the federation, reminding somewhat the de 
facto position of George Washington during 1776-1783, or Napoleon during 1798-
1814. Under the General, a governing body of a 10 member Council, called 
synarchontes, undertook the day to day administration. Further, three military 
commanders, the ipostrategos (major-general) the hipparchos, head of the cavalry, 
and navarchos (admiral) served under the general. Ancient sources attest also the 
existence of a grammateus (“secretary”) who may have been responsible with the 
“paperwork” of the federation, like the Assembly's and the Boule's decrees and laws 
(Larsen, 1972).          
 A very important element of the federation, was the isopoliteia of its citizens, 
meaning that a citizen of one member city-state, had political rights as a citizen, if he 
moved into another member city-state, a situation that clearly surpasses today’s 
European Union. A Portuguese moving for example to Germany, does not get 
automatically voting rights at German federal elections, as would be the case say, for 
a citizen of Patras moving to Megalopopolis, who were both members of the Achaean 
federation. Another innovative institutional element was the establishment of some 
kind of Federal Court of Justice.       
 Usually, such court(s) were empowered to solve political differences arising 
among member city-states, taking over a role of intermediation. Usually, a third 
member city-state was chosen for this task, as for example Megara in a dispute 
between Corinth and Epidaurus, or Patras between Thourioi and Megalopolis. 
Sometimes, a body of more than one city undertook this task, as for example 11 cities 
intermediating in litigation between Epidaurus and Arsionoe (Ager, 1996). The 
Federal Court(s) were also responsible for some criminal and property rights cases 
(possibly involving citizens of different member city-states (Larsen, 1972, p. 82). 
 Polybius goes as far as to write (2. 27. 9-11) “During times, these cities came 
to such perfection and welfare, that they were connected not only in friendship and 
alliances, but they had the same laws, the same measures and currency and common 
archons (government officials), members of the Boule and judges. In general, only 
this point showed that almost the whole of the Peloponnese was not a unique city: Its 
inhabitants were not circumvalised by the same wall, everything else was common 
and the same for everyone together and for each city-state apart.
3
  
 
2.2.  Military Organisation 
The federation disposed of a federal army under the Strategos, organized 
according to that period armies. It comprised heavy infantry in phalanx formations, 
                                                          
3
 Our own translation from the original text. 
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light infantry and cavalry. The federal army consisted of formations provided by the 
city-states and augmented by mercenaries if and when needed. In 217 BC for 
example, the federal forces consisted of 3000 infantry, 300 cavalry, 8000 mercenary 
infantry and 500 mercenary cavalry (Wallbank, 1933; Anderson, 1967; Larsen, 1971).
 An individual as commander of the naval forces of the federation is also 
attested. Many of the constituting city-states of the federation, like Corinth, Sikyon, 
Epidaurus had a long-standing and strong naval tradition. 
 
2.3 Economic organization 
 
  We have less information about the economic organization of the federation 
than about its political, so that in order to answer even tentatively some crucial 
questions, we will advance a few conjectures. The federation was a monetary union 
like today’s European Monetary Union (EMU), with the difference that it was a 
multicurrency area: There was a parallel circulation of federal coins and city-state 
coins, as attested by archaeological findings (see Caspari, 1917, Thompson, 1939). 
 This raises a number of questions: What was the analogy of federal to city-
state coins? To this, no answer can be given. Who was responsible for the minting of 
coins? We assume that there were city-state and federal mints, working in the city-
states and the capital. We further assume that the federal coins were linked to 
payments of the federal budget, as for the federal army and navy, federal 
administration, federal buildings in Aigion etc. An analogy to the EMU is that federal 
coins had on the one side a head of Zeus or Artemis and the name ΑΧΑΙΩΝ 
(meaning, “of the Achaeans”) and on the other side, the name of the issuing city-state 
like AXAIΩΝ-ΑΙΓΕΙΡΑΤΩΝ (“Achaeans of Aigira”) like euro coins which bear on 
the one side the symbol of the issuing member-state. This again could mean that 
federal coins were minted also at city-state mints on behalf of the federation. 
 A further question refers to the exchange rates: We assume that since all coins 
had silver content, the exchange was made according to the silver value of each coin. 
Then, again we presume the existence of banks that would have undertaken this task, 
in the main member city-states and the capital, Aigion. It is now accepted (Cohen, 
1992) that already during the fourth century Athens had a very developed banking 
system, and that the Greek world was monetized. Thus, we believe that the fourth 
century Athenian experience would have been diffused to the rest of the Greek world, 
especially in areas and city-states like Corinth, which were also important 
international trading centers. On this issue Roberts (2011, p. 130) argues for example, 
that that thirty-five Hellenistic cities included private banks during the 2
nd 
century BC. 
 Lastly, and very importantly, is the issue of the federal budget, on which we 
know nothing, but whose existence is made clear by the existence of federal coins. 
Such coins indicate the existence of a federal budget, else for what purpose should 
they have been issued? We assume as stated above, that the federal budget covered 
federal army, federal administration and buildings expenses, and perhaps a few 
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extraordinary expenses, like public federal festivals. Since the rise of the army and 
navy were variable, the size of budget must have varied too.    
 We will attempt at least an estimate of the military expenditure based on 
known army size for some years, to give at least an order of magnitude for the budget, 
bearing in mind that military expenditure was the major federal budget item: 
According to ancient sources (Loomis, 1998) the daily wage of soldiers during the 3
rd
 
century must have been 1.5 drachmae, and for cavalryman (including fodder) perhaps 
5 (Arvanitides and Kyriazis 2012; Pritchard, 2012).     
 The 217 BC federal army comprised in total 11.000 infantry and 800 cavalry, 
thus a total of 20.500 drachmae per day, or 615.000 per month, or about 100 talents, 
(one talent equals 6000 drachmae). Assuming an eight month campaign period per 
year, the total military cost for this year would have been 800 talent, a very substantial 
sum for the period. Even if we assume that all the other federal items came to about 
100 talents, we arrive at a total federal budget estimate of 900 talents, which is a very 
substantial sum, comparable to the Athenian budget with a revenue of 1200 talents in 
the 330’s during the time that Lycurgus was tamias (eg. finance minister, Kyriazis, 
2009). This sum must have represented also a substantial percentage of the, unknown 
size, federation’s total GDP, but certainly much more than the 0.95% of the EU’s GDP 
represented by the EU budget. 
 We know nothing also about the revenue side of the federal budget, but we 
will advance some hypothesis taking as a benchmark the Athenian 4
th
 century budget 
(Kyriazis, 2009). Revenue sources must have been: a) city-state contributions: The 
existence of federal coins minted in the city-states mints is such an indication: 
Possibly, the city-states gave their contributions by minting in their own mints coins 
which they then forwarded to the federal budget. b) custom duties levied on exports, 
imports, as was the case in ancient Athens, in the port of Piraeus, where the rate was 
2% on value. We do not know if this is the case in fact, but it is a possibility, 
especially if we assume the existence of an internal market, as we will discuss next. c) 
Military plunder: We assume, that military plunder during successful expeditions 
against enemies would accrue to the federal budget. It seems that the possibility of 
plundering during war campaigns must have been very common during ancient times. 
De Laix (1973, p. 60), based on Polybius (4.5.1) argues that the troops of a neighbor 
state to the Achaean federation, the Aetolian one, were accustomed to plundering. d) 
Liturgies.
4
 Again, we know nothing about it, but might it be possible, that some kind 
of trierarchy existed for the fleet’s warships, inspired by the Athenian example. 
 A last issue we raise here, is if and to what extent, the federation was not only 
a monetary union, but also an economic one. Again, we have limited evidence, but the 
indication we possess, permit us to advance tentative answers: The existence of 
monetary union and the circulation of parallel currencies are evidence of free mobility 
                                                          
4
 Liturgies were a very special type of taxation and service levied on rich Athenians, as for example 
trierarchy (See Gabrielsen, 1994). Under this, a wealthy Athenian undertook the running expenses (not 
wage costs) for the upkeep of a trireme warship for a year, of which he undertook also command. 
Being its commander in battle, the trierarch had a strong incentive to have a well-kept ship, since his 
own survival depended on this 
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of capital within the federation. The existence of isopoliteia for citizens is very strong 
evidence for the free circulation of labour. If a citizen of one member city-state has 
free political rights in another, then presumably he can settle and work there. Thus 
two of the main pillars of today’s EU, free circulation of capital and labour existed 
already in the Achaean federation.       
  The harmonization of measures and standards as attested in the passage of 
Polybius above, is an indication for the existence of free circulation of goods, and the 
existence of an internal market. These measures make sense only in order to 
implement such an internal market, else why introduce them? Thus, it seems that all 
three basic freedoms of modern federations were already present in the Achaean one.
 In the above section we have raised more questions than we could provide 
specific answers, due to a lack of evidence. Still, since these particular questions have 
been raised by us know, we hope that they will be a useful contribution for the start of 
research on these topics.        
  
3. The United Provinces5       
  
The United Provinces (Dutch Republic) arose out of revolution against Spain 
in the so-called Eighty Years War (1568-1648). They were formally recognized as an 
independent state by the Treaties of Westphalia and Münster, although in fact most of 
the provinces were free of Spanish occupation by the end of the 16
th
 century. They 
existed as the United Provinces till they were abolished by the French invasion of 
1795, which replaced the UP by the short-lived Batavian Republic.   
 We can trace here already parallels to the Achaean federation: The UP were 
established to counter an external threat, Spanish occupation (as the Achaean to 
counter Macedon and Sparta) and were abolished by foreign invasion and occupation, 
by the French (as the Achaeans by the Romans). The United Provinces were a federal 
state of seven provinces and within them, 52 semi-sovereign cities, prominent among 
them Amsterdam. The cities strong position within the UP provide again a parallel to 
the Achaean city-states.        
 The political structure of the UP was briefly as follows: The cities were 
administered by the Regenten city-councils, which elected the cities mayors and other 
officials. At city level, these were no general elections, and the citizens did not have 
political and voting rights (but did have property rights). Thus, the cities 
administration was oligarchic, the Regenten being in general, rich merchants and 
aristocrats. At second level, each province had an Assembly, the Provincial States , a 
kind of parliament more or less, whose members were delegated by the cities and 
other estates (usually, the nobility), thus being a representative body. The chief 
official of each province was a a Stadtholder (dutch: stadhouder) who can be seen as 
some kind of governor or the province’s president, but with the distinction that this 
                                                          
5
 This section is based on the findings of Halkos and Kyriazis (2005), Kyriazis (2006) and Davids and 
t’ Hart (2012) which provide additional references. 
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was a position traditionally held by members of the Orange-Nassau family. 
 At the federal level, there existed also a States General, a kind of Parliament 
consisting of representatives of the provinces, which met at the federal capital in the 
Hague, where the federal administration was also located. During most of the period, 
a stadtholder of the UP, a head of the Republic (a parallel to the Achaean Strategos, 
since he was both the military supreme commander of the union’s forces, and the 
political head) existed, but during the twenty years prior to the 3
rd
 Anglo-Dutch war 
of 1672, the post was vacant (it was the period during which the de Witt brothers were 
politically prominent).          
 From the brief description above, the federal structure of the UP becomes 
clear. In contrast to the Achaean federation, the UP were not a direct democracy and 
combined aristocratic-oligarchic political elements (at city-level) with representative 
democratic elements (at provinces and the Union level). The UP were a monetary and 
customs union with one currency the guilder. Concerning federal finances, the States 
General decided over matters such as army size and navy establishment. This 
representative body delegated executive powers over military matters to the Council 
of State, a parallel again to the Achaean Boule.     
 The provinces remained sovereign and fiscally autonomous. They were 
responsible for procuring the means for the soldiers through an appointment system, 
each province contributing a certain ratio according to population and wealth. All 
provinces stepped up their tax levels and introduced new fiscal measures. The States 
General set the policy priorities of the UP and voted each year for the sums to be 
spent by the generality (eg. the federal government) again a parallel to the decision 
making procedures of the Achaean Assembly). The main item of expenditure of the 
federal budget were the armed forces. At about 1641, the army took 52%, the navy 
26%, the fortifications 9%, the administration and diplomacy 5%, debt service 4%, 
pensions and miscellaneous 4% of total expenditure, estimated at 23.697.000 guilders 
(Davids and t’ Hart, 2012).        
 Almost the entire sum spent on soldier’s pay was provided for by provincial 
taxation. Each province was free to decide the means by which it should rise the 
revenue, so that the system of taxes varied across the provinces. The Union hardly 
commanded any own means. The only own means accruing to the federal budget were 
the revenues of the passports, a salt duty and later a lottery, but the yield from these 
sources was trifling in comparison with the amount raided through the provincial 
contributions, a situation reminding today’s European Union’s budget with its limited 
own means, (mainly custom duties, while the percentage of vat accruing tot the 
Union’s budget as a parallel to the UP provinces contributions).   
 The navy, on the other hand, was supported to be paid mainly out of the 
revenues of duties of usually 3-5% lower than the English ones, but higher than the 
2% 4
th
 century Athenian duties upon in - and outgoing goods, which was estimated at 
about 12% of the entire federal budget in the 1640’s. After a period of changes, the 
Administration of the navy crystalised by 1597 into five regional admiralties, each 
with right to appoint its own admiral. The admiralties themselves were run by Navy 
Boards, composed of a fixed number of representatives of different cities and 
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provinces, in a system of federal cross-representation. Deputies of the five admiralties 
regularly convened in the Hague to cooperate and coordinate strategy. 
 Apart from the custom duties mentioned above, the Navy was financed from 
subsidies granted by the provinces and public loans, both after bargaining and 
agreement in the States General. It must be borne in mind, that during the period, the 
UP, and mainly Amsterdam, were one of Europe’s major financial centers (the other 
being London) with a stock exchange and a developed banking system, which 
permitted the financing of the federal government through loans. 
 
4. Comparison and conclusions 
The political and economic structure of today’s European Union are well 
known, so that we will not analyse it here in detail. Table 1 illustrates the structure of 
the three federations, the Achaean, the UP and the EU (taking for granted the the 
today’steps for the further integration of the EU mean a gradual process for the 
creation of a federal type state). Taking as a basis of our discussion the characteristics 
illustrated in Table 1, we arrive at the following conclusions: First, all three 
federations show similarities in their political structure and administration. The main 
difference, a crucial one, concerns their democratic structure: In this, the Achaean 
which practiced direct democracy at both the local and the federal level, comes out as 
the most democratic.          
 The UP were representative democracies at the province and federal level, 
while the EU is a representative democracy at member-state level (with elements of 
direct democracy at city-and country level in some member states like Germany 
(Nohlen and Stöver, 2010), and a weak representative democracy at the federal 
(Union) level, with only one elected body, the European Parliament, which has only 
limited competences. Second, all three were monetary unions with a common 
currency (for Europe, the 17-member EMU), with the difference, that the Achaean 
federation had also a parallel circulation of city-states currency. Third, all practiced 
the so called “three fundamental economic freedoms”, free circulation of goods, 
labour and capital. This was augmented in the Achaean with the fundamental 
“political freedom” of isopoliteia, eg. citizen and voting rights in other member city-
states.          
 Fourth, all had a federal budget, devoted mainly in the first two, to the finance 
of the military forces. All had some “own” federal means (mainly custom duties) as 
federal revenues. None can be regarded as “fiscal union”, in the sense of having a 
harmonized tax system, tax basis and tax rates. We know nothing on this for the 
Achaean, we know that in the UP the tax basis and rates varied from province to 
province, and for the EU, these is a common tax base for vat, but different tax rates 
for incomes, property and capital profit. There are serious doubts if the EU is an 
“optimal fiscal area” so that harmonization could proceed in the future (Halkos and 
Kyriazis, 2006).        
 During recent years, dissatisfaction of citizens and euroscepticism is growing  
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Table 2: A comparative analysis of the institutional framework of the Aetolian and Achaean 
Confederacies in relation to the US and the EU.  
Federation 
Member 
states 
Capital Political structure 
Common 
citizenship 
Monetary 
union 
Common 
Foreign 
Policy 
 
Federal 
Armed 
Forces 
Federal 
budget 
 
 
Democratic 
Structure 
Achaean > 40 Aigion 
 
Local (city) Assemblies 
+ Federal Assembly (Synkletos) 
 
Federal Council (Boule) 
 
Strategos (General-military commander 
and head of federation) 
 
Supreme Council of the 10 (synarchontes) 
 
Deputy General 
hipparch commander of cavalry 
Nauarchos (Admiral) , 
Public Secretary 
 
Federal Courts 
 
isopoliteia, yes 
Yes, federal 
and city-
states 
currencies in 
parallel 
circulation 
Yes, army 
and navy 
 
 
Yes, strong 
own means, 
probably 
custom duties 
and cities 
contributions 
Strong direct 
democracy at 
local and 
federal level 
UP 
7 
provinces 
 
52 cities 
The 
Hague 
City administrations 
 
Provincial States  
 
Federal States General 
 
Council of State 
 
Stadholder (Provinces) 
 
Admiral-General, Captain-General  
 
5 Admiralties 
Yes, but not 
voting rights 
for all citizens, 
thus more 
“equality of 
law” 
Yes, common 
currency only 
 
Yes, army 
and navy 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, 
relatively 
strong, 
custom 
duties, cities 
and provinces 
contributions 
Non existed 
at city level, 
strong at 
provincial 
and federal 
level 
 
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
 
 
27 
member-
states 
 
 
 
 
Brussels 
 
European Parliament 
 
European Commission 
 
European Court of Justice 
 
European Councils of Ministers +  Council 
of the EU 
 
President 
 
Ministers of external Affairs 
 
 
 
no 
 
 
Yes, for EMU 
and the 
European 
Central Bank 
No 
federal 
army and 
navy- 
weak 
CFSP 
 
 
Very weak 
(0,95% of 
GDP in 2013) 
 
Own means, 
mainly 
custom duties 
and small 
percentage of 
vat 
Weak, no 
direct 
democracy, 
only elected 
Parliament 
with limited 
powers, non-
elected other 
bodies 
Source: Interactive analysis based on the findings of Aymard (1938), Briscoe (1974), Thompson 
(1939), Larsen (1971, 1972 and 1975) and Wallbank (2010) for the Achaean federation, Kyriazis 
(2006) and Davids and t’ Hart (2012) for the UP and Moussis (1998) for the EU.  
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fast in many EU member-states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Spain), mainly due to the austerity measures introduced 
by their governments. What we believe is crucial here, is the perception by citizens in 
these countries (and we emphasize the world perception) that these measures have 
been imposed by the EU, and its strong member, Germany against their own and 
possibly, their elected government’s wishes.6     
 All successful federations are based on three fundamental principles, 
solidarity, trust and community of interest, both in the relations between their 
member-states, and the attitude of citizens towards, the federation. Where the three 
principals were strong, the respective federation had great cohesion. When they are 
weak or begin to waken, as in today’s EU, cohesion starts to suffer and the federation 
may be in danger. This argument is also verified by the findings of Musgrave (1961, 
1998, p 187) who argued through the theory of economic federalism that states 
willingly decide to participate in a federation type multinational political entity in 
order to increase their level of national security, to establish a custom union or to 
achieve a series of other specific goals. The relation between economic development 
and federal political structures is also corroborated by the findings of Pauly (1973, 
1998).           
 In previous studies Kyriazis and Paparrigopoulos, (2011, 2012) and Kyriazis 
and Economou (2012 and forthcoming) we have analysed for classical Greece, how 
these principles-values evolved in the military field due to the introduction of the 
phalanx formation, the heavy infantryman-hoplite, and the fleets. These values such 
as trust, cohesion, bravery, courage, discipline), virtue, self-sacrifice, self-
consciousness, altruism, harmony, friendship, politeness, justice, self-denial, fair 
competition, equality, egalitarianism, self-awareness, temperance, isonomia (political 
equality), isegoria (right to speak and express freely ones’ personal ideas, otherwise, 
democracy), homonoia (concord), freedom etc were transformed into political and 
democratic values. Ancient and modern sources of literature such as those we present 
here so far, convey that this tradition continued also in the Achaean federation and 
was present also in the UP. Federations based on defense against a great external 
threat, as the Achaean, the medieval Swiss against the Austrians and Burgundies, the 
UP against Spain, the USA against Great Britain, develop solidarity trust, cohesion 
and a sense of community of interest.      
                                                          
6
 N. Kyriazis in a series of press articles analyses the perception prevalent among a majority of 
Southern member-states citizens of the imposition by the EU of harsh measures under extreme pressure 
or even threats, as in the cases of Cyprus. The analogy goes back to the western powers and Japan’s 
treatment of Qing Dynasty China during the second half of the 19
th
 century-beginning of the twentieth, 
which resulted in the Opium Wars, the Taiping and Boxer revolts, civil war, the fall of empire of 
Japanese, a Japanese invasion and chaos. The utter contempt with which the EU and Chancellor Merkel 
has treated property rights, as for example the PSI also of individual Greek bondholders and the 
expropriation of deposit holders of some Cypriot banks, is truly amazing and without precedent. Thus 
certainly does not generate feelings of solidarity and trust. The prevailing feelings of insecurity and 
uncertainly among almost all the EU citizens concerning that safety of their bank savings does not 
promote growth. Econometric studies have established how important trust is for growth. See Zak and 
Knack (2001) and Dearmon and Grier (2009).   
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 These values and principles are the “glue”7 that hold them together, so long as 
the threat persists, defense is successful and the economy thrives. If this persists long 
enough, the political and institutional structure is embodied in the society, so that it 
continues even after the initial reason, the external threat, ceases to exist, as in the 
cases of the Swiss federation and the USA. This endurance is founded still on 
common defense, a strong federal budget that undertakes the finance of policies at the 
federal level, and strong political and democratic institutions at the same level, that 
legitimize the federation in the eyes of their citizens. If you vote for example for the 
federation’s president (even if indirectly) as in the USA and if you serve and perhaps 
fight in the armed forces of the federation, then you have a sense of being a citizen of 
the federation, of belonging to the USA or Switzerland, and not, just say, to the State 
of Arizona or the canton of Unterwalden, a sense of promoting the supreme political 
idea of homomoia.
8
         
 All the above seem to be lacking in today’s EU and we advance these 
preliminary ideas as a possible explanation, to be analysed more in future works. The 
EU lacks a strong federal budget, common defense and armed forces, and democratic 
legitimization in its organs, as indicated above. The subsidionity principle for 
example, which delegates many competence to the national level, although 
understandable in today’s political situation, certainly does not increase cohesion. In 
view of the above, can we learn something for the Achaean federation thus, may be 
useful in reducing the EU’s democratic deficit and increase solidarity, trust, 
community of interest and cohesion among its citizens?    
 We suggest that this may be undertaken along the following lines: First, a 
more democratic and direct democratic procedures must be introduced at the political 
level, for example, the President and the “Foreign Minister” of the EU, known also as 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy must be 
elected by universal vote and not be appointed. The only elected EU body, the 
European Parliament, should have increased competences. Lastly, legally binding 
popular initiatives at EU level should be introduced (and not as per Lisbon Treaty, 
only of a consultive character) as practiced in other federations like the Swiss, or 
some states of federations (like for example, California in the USA and Bavaria in 
Germany).           
 Second, the size of resources of the EU budget should be increased. A “0.95% 
solidarity”9 is just not sufficient, if the EU really wants to develop into a true federal 
union. Third, economic measures should be discussed, and we believe, as increasingly 
more economists suggest, be changed. Austerity measures were necessary in many 
member-states in the recent past. But solidarity in austerity is austerity is certainly not 
a permanent solution because citizens of member-states suffering under it, and the 
                                                          
7
 We call this a “glue”, inspired by the Athenian 4th century orator Demades, who called theorika (eg. 
money paid out of the Athenian budget to citizens, in order to enable them to participate in the 
Assembly) the “glue of democracy” (Plut. Mor. 1007B). 
8
 Homonoia is usually being translated as concord, but P. Cartledge in a personal communication 
suggested to us that a better translation could be “same-mindness” and unanimity, which is stronger 
than concord. 
9
 This ironic term has again been introduced in a series of press articles by N. Kyriazis. 
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recession it induces, will not accept it forever, thus threatening the future cohesion of 
the EMU.          
 We are aware that this analysis and our suggestion open up a vast future area 
of research and discussion, which we hope that our paper helps to promote. 
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